Computer Anti-forensics Methods and their Impact on Computer Forensic Investigation by Pajek, Przemyslaw et al.
H. Jahankhani, A.G. Hessami, and F. Hsu (Eds.): ICGS3 2009, CCIS 45, pp. 145–155, 2009. 
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009 
Computer Anti-forensics Methods and Their Impact on 
Computer Forensic Investigation 
Przemyslaw Pajek and Elias Pimenidis 
School of Computing IT and Engineering,  
University of East London, United Kingdom 
pajkow@gmail.com, e.pimenidis@uel.ac.uk 
Abstract. Electronic crime is very difficult to investigate and prosecute, mainly 
due to the fact that investigators have to build their cases based on artefacts left 
on computer systems. Nowadays, computer criminals are aware of computer fo-
rensics methods and techniques and try to use countermeasure techniques to ef-
ficiently impede the investigation processes. In many cases investigation with 
such countermeasure techniques in place appears to be too expensive, or too 
time consuming to carry out. Often a case can end up being abandoned and in-
vestigators are left with a sense of personal defeat. The methodologies used 
against the computer forensics processes are collectively called Anti-Forensics. 
This paper explores the anti forensics problem in various stages of computer fo-
rensic investigation from both a theoretical and practical point of view. 
Keywords: Computer Forensics Investigation, Computer Forensics Tools, 
Computer Anti-forensics Methods. 
1   Introduction 
Locard’s principle states that when a crime is committed, there is a cross-transfer of 
evidence between the scene and perpetrator [1]. In the digital world, evidence resides 
mainly on computer hard drives in the shape of files, logs, or any other artefacts depict-
ing pertinent activity. Projecting Locard’s principle into the cyber world an understand-
ing of the correlation between such types of evidence, the times when particular events 
took place and the users who committed those actions can be reached. The main task of 
computer forensic investigators is to reveal and connect these three facts into one coher-
ent statement revealing the whole nature of the particular action. On the contrary, the 
main aim of computer anti-forensics is to hide or alter electronic evidence so that it can-
not be used in legal proceedings or it is too costly and time consuming to retrieve and 
examine. Computer anti-forensics methodologies vary and can be applied so they can 
contaminate any stage of the computer investigation process. Whilst most of the tech-
niques are used directly against computer forensic tools, some of these methodologies 
can be used for quite legitimate reasons. Encryption for example can be used to protect 
company assets; digital watermarking can be used to prevent copyright infringement in 
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digital imaging. Conversely, these techniques, if applied against computer forensics, 
could potentially hide crucial data from investigators. 
Many authors have discussed computer anti-forensic techniques and have hailed 
them as very efficient ones. However, very little practical work has been done in this 
area in terms of testing those techniques and practically evaluating their efficiency 
and effectiveness. The main aim of this research is to identify the most known com-
puter anti-forensic techniques and test practically them against computer forensic 
software. The key question to be addressed is whether computer anti-forensics can 
hinder the investigation process and prevent real artefacts being discovered and being 
admissible in the legal process? The work presented here is based on the experimental 
part of the first author’s MSc dissertation.   
2   Computer Forensics Methodologies versus Anti-forensics 
To efficiently test those techniques, it is necessary to identify the stages of computer 
forensic processes where investigators follow clear and well defined procedures [2].  
At every stage different computer forensic methodologies have been used and various 
anti-forensic techniques have been applied against these methodologies.  
2.1   Stage One – Elimination of Source 
Preservation of data process relies on the securing of all data found on an inspected 
drive irrespective of its pertinence to an investigation. At this stage the main task is to 
only acquire an identical image of the analysed media.   
One of the main methods which could be applied in this task is to prevent pertinent 
data being preserved. One of the easiest and most efficient methods would be to block 
the access to the media; however when investigators have permission to investigate it, 
such a move is not possible. Therefore the next sensible option is the elimination of a 
source [3].  Like most of counter-forensic techniques these methodologies can be ap-
plied only before image acquisition.  
The easiest method of elimination of a source is simply a disabling tool responsible 
for creation of source. This could be, for example, done by various modifications of 
computer settings and registry. Operating system will stop logging users’ activity and 
so. If a user performed a particular action, this would be automatically hindered. An 
example of this can be the editing of an operating system group policy, in this way the 
system will not log a visited website in the browser’s history [4].  
The next method of elimination of a source is log and disk wiping. This method re-
lies on the deletion process, where special tools need to be applied in order to “safely” 
delete traces of data from any places on the hard drive. This should include all entries 
on HDD incl. all MFT entries and its attributes, orphan files and so forth.  Previous 
research in this area has revealed that not all programs claimed to be anti-forensic can 
efficiently delete all traces of data [5]. Similar experiment was used to check whether 
a new set of tools available in 2008 were more efficient than those applied in 2005.  
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2.2   Stage Two – Hiding the Data 
In the second stage of the computer forensic process, usually investigators identify 
and extract the information which can be pertinent to the investigation. At this stage 
counter forensic tools have the greatest use. In contrary to the previous stage, they do 
not delete relevant data but hide it in a way that it is very difficult to find and exam-
ine. Research about these methods has distinguished some ways of how data can be 
hidden on digital media.   
Unusual directories and manipulation of file headers - in this method, information 
is hidden in unusual places.  For example, the file system and deep nested directories. 
This gives a greater likelihood that hidden files will be overseen during the “harvest-
ing” process. Another method which would inhibit investigators is the manipulation 
of file extensions and file headers. Whereas simple manipulation of extension does 
not make any difference for forensic software, manipulation of file headers and foot-
ers may potentially misled forensic software.  
Hiding data in slack space – On media like hard drives, the data is saved in clusters 
divided by sectors. Currently the most popular files system in use is NTFS.  Main 
information about files such as file name, size, time stamps and the number of clusters 
is stored on the hard drive [6]. However, actual data is stored in other place. In many 
cases saved data does not use all sectors in a dedicated cluster, some of them remain 
unused. Counter forensic tools can use those places to store data. Tools like Slacker 
can scrap and spread data into those places. The only way to retrieve it is to use 
slacker again by special reversible algorithm.  
Stenography – This is a technique of hiding data within other data where the pres-
ence is not revealed. In many cases it is used for legitimate reasons by inserting digi-
tal watermarks in the image, so the owners can easily protect themselves from copy 
right infringement. Simultaneously, instead of watermarks, any other data can be in-
serted. Investigators using forensic software may easily bypass data hidden in that 
way, as many forensic packages are not especially dedicated to reveal steganography. 
Every innocent family picture may be in fact a well camouflaged collection of very 
important data [7].  
Encryption – in many cases it is used to protect information from unauthorized ac-
cess but it can be applied against the computer forensic investigation process. Using 
encryption, the presence of data is not concealed, but it is extremely difficult to exam-
ine encrypted media using forensic software. The process may become too time con-
suming and too cost full to implement.  
2.3   Stage Three – Direct Attacks against Computer Forensic Software  
One of the main ways to carry an attack against computer forensics software is to ex-
ploit and use its vulnerabilities against it. Computer forensics software, like any other 
computer program, was created by software vendors. If the credibility of forensics 
software is put to question during the legal process, any evidence found, may be dis-
missed due to the unreliability of the software. Currently there are two main ways as 
to how the reliability of forensic software may be compromised.  
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Time Stamp Modification – Every file on removable media has four values called 
M.A.C.E. Those values are responsible for recording Modification, Access, Creation 
time stamps of that file. Computer forensics packages reading those values, give indica-
tions to examiners about time and date issues of any updates and changes to the contents 
of a file. However those values can be manipulated and real time and date stamps may 
not be displayed correctly in computer forensics software. Knowing this, a legal defence 
process may put to question the reliability of computer forensic software.  
Hash Collision – Hash function is an algorithm used to create a unique fixed value 
string from any amount of data. This process is irreversible. In computer forensics it 
guarantees that digital evidence has not been changed during the investigation proc-
ess. However in 2005 a student from China created a hash collision from two different 
inputs of data.  The student managed to create the same hash outputs from the two 
different sets of inputs [8].  Having this ability, any user could efficiently undermine 
the credibility of digital evidence. During this research, this method was only consid-
ered from the theoretical perspective in potential in threatening the credibility of 
computer forensics software [9]. 
3   Experimenting with Anti-forensics Techniques 
For the experimental part of this work all the techniques discussed here were tested on 
new hard drives. The criteria used to evaluate the various techniques applied in this 
experiment were drawn from professional reports on previous research in this area. 
Based on these, the following test structure was followed during the experimental 
phase of the work which was split into three stages.  
Stage one – for wiping / safe deletion tools 
• Test whether traces of previously deleted data can be revealed 
• Test whether actual data can be recovered 
Stage two – hiding data techniques  
• Amount of potential data that can be safely hidden 
• Technique applied 
• Test whether presence of hidden data can be revealed  
• Test whether actual data can be read 
Stage three – undermining credibility of the software  
• Test whether time stomp modifications can be revealed  
• Test whether original time stomp values can be recovered 
In determining the counter-forensics tools and methodologies used for experiment the 
only two criteria applied were those of availability and popularity in the most popular 
search engines. In most cases counter-forensics methodologies are available through 
internet search engines. Therefore the assumption that the more popular a tool is in 
search engines; the likelihood of this tool being applied increases is a plausible one.  
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Table 1. Tools utilised in the first experiment 
Tool 
Name 
Manufacturer Version Release 
Date 
License Downloadable URL  
Eraser Heidi Computers 
Ltd 
5.86.1 2007 Freeware http://www.heidi.ie/ 
node/6  
Flex TK 
Express 
Flexense 2.8.42 2008 Freeware http://www.flexense. 
com/downloads.html  
Free 
Wipe 
Wizard 
Wizard  
Recovery.com 
1.5 No older 
than 2006 
Freeware http://www. 
wizardrecovery.com/ 
free_wipe/free_wipe_ 
wizard.php  
R-Wipe 
and 
Clean 
R-Tools  
Technology  
Inc. 
8.1b_14
62 
2008 Free 15 
days trial 
http://www. 
r-wipe.com/ 
Disk_Cleaning_ 
Download.shtml  
 
The hard drives were divided into the same 4 sectors which were the same for all 
tools. Various sets of documents were saved on them and subsequently erased by 
those tools. Next every partition was forensically imaged and put into analysis.  
For the second experiment, i.e. hiding the data, only one tool was applied for each 
of the techniques mentioned above:  
 
Table 2. Tools and Techniques for experiment 2 
Technique Tool 
Name 
Manu-
facturer 
Ver.  Release 
Date 
License Downloadable URL  
Manipula-
tion of files 
signatures  
Manual technique / 
tool used for editing 
files: Hex  
Workshop  
4.23 2007 Trial http://download.cnet. 
com/Hex-Workshop/ 
3000-2352_ 
4-10298339.html  
Slacker Metas-
ploit 
- 2005 Free-
ware 
http://www.metasploit. 
com/research/projects/ 
antiforensics  
Hiding 
data in 
Slack 
space 
Run time disk  
Explorer/ Manual 
3.41 - Trial  http://www.runtime.org/ 
data-recovery-downloads. 
htm  
Stenogra-
phy 
Invisi-
ble 
Secrets 
Neobyte 
Solu-
tions 
4.6.2 2007 15 Day 
free trial 
http://www. 
neobytesolutions.com/ 
invisiblesecrets/  
Encryp-
tion  
True 
Crypt 
True-
crypt  
6.1 a 2003-
2008 
Free-
ware  
http://www.truecrypt. 
org/downloads  
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In this experiment various files of different types were manipulated, data in various 
files were also hidden by steganography. One partition was completely encrypted. 
However the Slacker tool did not work when it came to hiding data on the external 
partition. Sets of errors when reading the master file table on the external partition and 
lack of relevant documentation about the “Slacker” software made it impossible to 
use the Slacker tool for the experiment.  Therefore further experiments were carried 
with manual hiding of data in slack space.  
For experiment three hiding – manipulation of time stamps, 4 different packages 
were used in 4 different partitions, various sets of files were put into these partitions, 
and subsequently different time stomps were manipulated. Four separate forensic im-
ages were created and put into analysis.  
 
Table 3. Tools used for experiment 3 
Tool name Manufacturer Version License Downloadable 
URL 
Attribute 
Changer 
Romain 
Petages 
6.10.a Freeware http://www. 
petges.lu/  
Attribute 
Manager 
Milksoft 2.6 10 days 
Trial 
http://www. 
miklsoft.com/ 
downloads.html  
Time 
Stomp 
Metasploit  Freeware http://www. 
metasploit.com/ 
research/projects/ 
antiforensics/  
File  
Properties 
Changer 
Segobit  
Software 
1.32  http://www. 
segobit.com/ 
fpc.htm  
 
Similarly to the previous experiment, the tool Time Stomp was excluded from the 
experiment as it failed to change most of the MACE values.  
All images were forensically analyzed using the following computer forensics 
software tools:  
 
• Forensic Toolkit-FTK Version 1.71 build 07.06.22 (Demo version)  
• FTK 1.81.0 – fully licensed.  
3.1   Experimental Results 
Experiment one – Using Wiping tools:  
Forensic analysis proved that most of the tools applied for wiping data did not effi-
ciently delete all traces of it. From the four tools used, only the fourth one managed to 
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efficiently erase all traces of data and meet the target of effectively hiding data from 
forensics tools. The rest of the anti-forensics tools employed in this experiment left 
many traces that made it possible to prove that the data was previously saved on an ana-
lysed hard drive. Table 4 below summarises the outcome of this experiment and shows 
where traces of data were found following the wiping operation, for each tool utilised. 
 
Table 4. Results of Stage 1 of the experimental work 
Tool / Deleted 
area 
Presence of deleted 
data revealed/ if yes 
where? MFT Entry 
Actual Data/If 
yes from where? 
Forensic 
tool used 
Eraser v. 5.86.1-
Freeware 
Yes, NTFS\$LogFile, 
NTFS\$I30 
No FTK 1.71 -
demo 
External Examiner Yes, NTFS\$LogFile, 
NTFS\$I30 
No FTK 
1.81.0 – 
fully  
licensed  
Flex TK Express 
V. 2.8.42 –  
Freeware 
Yes, Orphan files, 
NTFS\$LogFile,, $MFT, 
$I30 
No FTK 1.71 -
demo 
External Examiner Yes, Orphan files, 
NTFS\$LogFile,, $MFT, 
$I30 
No FTK 
1.81.0 – 
fully  
licensed 
Free Wipe Wizard 
1.5 (Freeware) 
Yes, NTFS\$LogFile,  
$MFT, $I30 + List of 
deleted files 
Yes, 60% of data, 
by data carving 
FTK 1.71 -
demo 
External Examiner Yes, NTFS\$LogFile,  
$MFT, $I30 , change 
log file+ List of deleted 
files 
Yes, 60 % Data , 
method not  
defined 
FTK 
1.81.0 – 
fully  
licensed 
Tool 4 R-Wipe 
and Clean v 
8.1b_1462 
No No FTK 1.71 
–demo 
External Examiner No No FTK 
1.81.0 – 
fully  
licensed 
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Experiment two – Hiding the data: 
Using the trial version of the FTK1.71 computer forensics package, 50% of the ma-
nipulated signatures were efficiently recognized by forensics software.  Manually 
hidden data in the file slack space were fully revealed and completely readable in fo-
rensics software. In terms of steganography computer forensics software did not re-
veal the data, but an entropy test [10] raised suspicion. Encryption has also managed 
to hide the data so that forensics software did not recover actual data but is at also 
raised suspicion. Detailed results can be found in the table 5 below.  
 
Table 5. Experimental results stage two 
Techniques 
applied /Areas 
of hard drive  
Presence of 
hidden data 
revealed 
Actual Data 
recovered 
Recovery  
technique applied 
Forensic 
tool used 
 
Manipulation 
of file  
Extensions 
and  
Signatures 
Yes – 50% 
of tested 
files 
Yes  - 50% 
of tested 
files 
General Forensic 
Software  
FTK 1.71 –
demo 
External  
Examiner 
Yes- 75 % of 
tested files 
Yes  - 75% 
of tested 
files 
General Forensic 
Software plus hex 
editing and  
checking for  
extension. 
FTK 1.81.0 
– fully  
licensed 
Stenography 
in single  
image files 
No, but 
raised  
suspicion 
No General Forensic 
Software +  
Entropy tests 
FTK 1.71 –
demo 
External  
Examiner 
No No FTK 1.81.0 – fully 
licensed 
FTK 1.81.0 
Encryption of 
Volume 
No, but 
raised  
suspicion 
No General Forensic 
Software +  
Entropy tests 
FTK 1.71 –
demo 
External  
Examiner 
No No General Forensic 
Software 
FTK 1.81.0 
Manual  
Hiding in File  
Slack Space 
Yes Yes General Forensic 
Software 
FTK 1.71 –
demo 
External  
Examiner 
Yes Yes General Forensic 
Software 
FTK 1.81.0 
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It is possible that further tests utilizing programs such as Outguess or Stegdetect 
would have revealed hidden data by stenography or encryption, but forensics software 
on its own was unable to do it.  
 
Experiment three- Time Stamp Modification: 
All three packages measured against computer forensic software succeeded the in 
value created, however in values for Accessed package the demo version succeeded at  
 
Table 6. Experimental Results Stage 3 
Tool  
used  
Time Stamp -  
value Created  
Time Stamp - 
value Modi-
fied 
Time Stamp - 
value  Last  
Accessed 
Time stamp - 
value Entry 
Modified 
 Manipulation 
revealed in % 
Original.  
Time stamp 
recovered in % 
Manipulation 
revealed in % 
Original. 
 Time stamp 
recovered  
Manipulation 
revealed in % 
Original. 
 Time stamp 
recovered in %
Not Ana-
lysed 
Forensic 
tool 
used 
 
Tool 1 - 
Freeware 
No - 0% No - 0% Yes–25%  FTK 
1.71 –
demo 
External 
Examiner 
Yes- 100% Yes – 100 % Yes – 100 %  FTK 
1.81.0 
Tool 2 – 
10 Days 
Trial 
No - 0% Yes- 33% Yes -25 %  FTK 
1.71 –
demo 
External 
Examiner 
Yes- 100% Yes-  100% Yes-  100%  FTK 
1.81.0 
Tool 3- 
Time 
Stomp - 
Freeware 
Tool Failed to 
work 
Tool Failed to 
work 
Tool Failed to 
work 
 FTK 
1.71 –
demo 
External 
Examiner 
     
Tool 4 – 
Trial 
No – 0% No – 0% Yes - 50%  FTK 
1.71 –
demo 
External 
Examiner 
Yes- 100% Yes- 100% Yes- 100%  FTK 
1.81.0 
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100 % in value created, while for Values Modified and Last Accessed the success 
rates averaged 33%. In a full version of forensic software, where an experienced ex-
ternal examiner analysed the image, results were more disadvantageous for packages. 
Detection rate was 100% in all three packages.   
4   Discussion – Conclusions  
The conducted experiments proved that not all counter-forensics techniques are effi-
cient when compared against forensics software. In many cases tools failed to hide or 
delete important data. It is highly likely that the detection rate achieved by forensics 
software depends on the sophistication of the counter-forensics technique applied. 
This is clearly visible in the encryption and steganography examples where processes 
and algorithms are much more complex compared to other used in these experiments. 
The main aim of this research was to test whether current known counter-forensics 
technology can efficiently interfere with computer forensics processes. The results 
displayed in the tables in section 3 above clearly indicate that only two of the tested 
techniques have quite high success rates. The results obtained for other techniques 
vary amongst them but the average rate is not as high as in those for encryption in 
steganography.  In analysing the results it is very important to take into account the 
experience of the analyst and the software package applied in the experiment. A more 
experienced investigator with a fully licensed package could have had a better detec-
tion rate than a trainee with trial version only. It is also important to remember that in 
every forensic case the objectives are different, as are the techniques applied to pre-
vent achieving them.  
To achieve more accurate results and to be able to develop a fuller picture as to the 
current status of counter forensic methodologies, research should be continued in this 
field. It is recommended that more specific research should be carried about each in-
dividual technique against a range of different forensic tools. Also, the various anti-
forensics techniques should be evaluated against packages specifically designed for 
detection of those techniques in order to develop a much clearer opinion as to whether 
it is possible to beat counter forensics. It is important to note that research on anti-
forensics are also a great source of information for those who want to harness systems 
against those techniques that aim to hide malicious activity and to other interested 
groups such as software vendors. Knowing, whether counter forensics posses a real 
threat to computer forensics can be vital in many cases in the future and to the devel-
opment and shaping of electronic transactions and possibly to the future of the whole 
digital world.   
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